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The Transparency of Derivative Disclosures by Australian Firms in 
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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the transparency of derivative disclosures of Australian firms 
in the extractive industries using 1998 to 2001 financial reports. The quality of 
financial reporting has become a major corporate governance issue since the collapse 
of prominent companies such as Enron in the United States, HIH Insurance in 
Australia, and, of particular relevance here, Barings PLC in the United Kingdom, 
where the losses were caused by derivative instruments. Disclosure transparency is an 
important component of the quality of financial reporting. We measure transparency 
based on a disclosure index developed from AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure 
of Financial Instruments. We examine the relationship between transparency and firm 
characteristics represented by size, performance, growth opportunities, auditor and 
type of extractive firm. The results indicate that the transparency of derivative 
disclosures among firms in the extractive industries has increased over the period.  
However, there is still evidence of non-compliance with the disclosure requirements, 
especially in relation to net fair value. We find that firm size, price-earnings ratio and 
debt-to-equity ratio, and to a lesser extent, market-to-book ratio and profitability are 
associated with disclosure transparency.  
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The Transparency of Derivative Disclosures by Australian Firms in 
the Extractive Industries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the transparency of derivative disclosures of Australian 
firms in the extractive industries.1 The quality of financial reporting has become a 
major corporate governance issue since the collapse of prominent companies such as 
Enron in the United States, HIH Insurance in Australia, and Barings PLC, the United 
Kingdom merchant bank. Of particular relevance here is the case of Barings PLC 
where the losses were caused by derivative instruments. Disclosure transparency is an 
important component of the quality of financial reporting.  In this paper we explore 
the association between the transparency of derivative disclosures and various firm 
characteristics. We focus on the extractive industries as they extensively use 
derivative financial instruments to hedge their exploration and production risks 
(Berkman, Bradbury, Hancock, and Innes, 1997). Concern about the risks attached to 
hedging instruments has forced accounting standard setters to promulgate rules for 
the disclosure and presentation of these instruments so that users are aware of their 
existence and therefore will be able to make more informed decisions.  
We examine the transparency of derivative disclosure for a sample of publicly 
listed firms in the extractive industries for the period 1998 to 2001. We use a 
disclosure index based on five categories of information as required in AASB 1033 
Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments.2 These categories are 
                                                 
1 According to Deegan (2005), extractive industries refer to firms which engage in the search for 
natural substances of commercial value such as minerals, oil and natural gas.  
2 With the move to full harmonization in January 2005, Australia has now adopted AASB 132 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation and AASB 139 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement which are essentially identical to their international equivalents (IAS 32 
and IAS 139 respectively).    
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accounting policy, hedges of anticipated future transactions, risk information, net fair 
value information, and commodity contracts regarded as financial instruments.   
The study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. We 
measure the transparency of derivative disclosures over a recent time period prior to 
the adoption of international accounting standards in Australia. Further, we examine 
the association between our measure of transparency and various firm characteristics. 
These characteristics are represented by size, performance, type of auditor, type of 
extractive firm, leverage and growth opportunities.  While our study focuses on the 
Australian regulatory environment, it contributes to the international accounting 
literature by providing evidence on disclosure transparency in a setting where 
accounting standards are mandatory but compliance with those standards is not 
always rigidly enforced (Hope, 2003a).  
The results show that, while the transparency of derivative disclosures among 
firms in the extractive industries has increased, firms still use their discretion 
especially in relation to the disclosure of net fair value information. We find that 
larger firms and firms with high price-earnings ratios and debt to equity ratios provide 
more transparent derivative disclosures in their annual reports. We also find that 
performance, measured by profitability, and growth opportunities, measured by 
research and development and market-to-book value, are significant in some years but 
not in others.   
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. Section 2 explains the 
Australian reporting requirements relating to derivative financial instruments. Section 
3 discusses prior research and develops the research questions examined in the study. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection, research design, and the variables. Section 5 
presents the results and section 6 concludes the paper. 
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 2. Background: Derivatives and financial reporting 
The relevant accounting standard relating to financial instruments in Australia at 
the time of this study was AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial 
Instruments.  This standard was issued in 19963 and subsequently amended in 1999 to 
achieve greater harmonization with the international standard, IAS 32 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation.4  It followed the withdrawal of an 
exposure draft, ED59, which attempted to introduce recognition and measurement 
rules for financial instruments in addition to disclosure requirements.  As a result of 
extensive lobbying against this exposure draft, the Australian standard setters decided 
to defer the recognition and measurement issue until an equivalent international 
standard was issued.   
Many derivative financial instruments are not recognized as assets and liabilities 
in the balance sheet and the unrealized gain or loss on these instruments is not 
recorded in the income statement. Therefore, firms are required to disclose 
information related to the instruments. This includes the objectives of holding or 
issuing derivative financial instruments (AASB 1033 paragraph 5.3). The disclosure is 
expected to help users to understand why entities use derivatives (by explaining the 
risks attached to the entity), and what they plan to achieve by the use of the 
derivatives.  In addition, firms are required to disclose information about hedge 
activities, if they use financial instruments to manage risk associated with anticipated 
future transactions.5
                                                 
3 The standard was based on ED65 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments, which was 
issued in 1995. 
4 Since AASB 1033 does not differ significantly from AASB 132, we refer to the relevant paragraphs 
of the former standard as this was current at the time of our study and formed the basis of our 
disclosure index.  
5 AASB 1033 paragraph 5.8 requires firms to disclose a description of the anticipated transactions and 
the hedging instruments used plus the amount of any deferred or unrecognized gain or loss and the 
expected timing of revenue or expense recognition.  
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AASB 1033 paragraph 5.6 requires firms to disclose the net fair value of 
financial assets and liabilities, including unrecognised derivative financial 
instruments. The methods adopted and any significant assumptions made in 
determining net fair value must also be disclosed. Paragraph 5.7 requires more 
information when one or more financial assets are recognized at an amount in excess 
of their net fair value including the reasons for not reducing the carrying amount. 
In addition to the above, firms are also required to disclose terms, conditions, 
and accounting policies adopted (paragraph 5.2), interest rate risk (paragraph 5.4), 
credit risk (paragraph 5.5), and commodity contracts which are regarded as financial 
instruments (paragraph 5.9).  
 
3.  Prior research and development of research questions 
3.1. Disclosure Transparency of Derivative Information 
Two Australian studies on the transparency of derivative disclosure have been 
documented in Chalmers and Godfrey (2000), and Chalmers (2001). Chalmers and 
Godfrey (2000) explore the disparity between the accounting treatment of derivative 
instruments encouraged by the 1996 version of AASB 1033 and firms’ accounting 
practices based on the 1998 financial statements of Australia’s largest 500 firms. This 
study extends previous survey research by identifying firms’ derivative accounting 
policies and approaches to fair value determination. The study found that the quality 
of the disclosures was less than satisfactory, with the major weaknesses being: 
 The lack of accounting policy disclosures relating to specific types of 
instruments, and incompleteness in fair value disclosures. 
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 Considerable variation in note disclosure both across firms and within 
firms, hindering the understandability, comparability and consistency 
of derivative instruments information. 
 Limited variation in firms’ derivative instruments accounting policies, 
with most sample firms employing hedge accounting techniques.  
The study also suggests that, while firms appeared to have accepted the 
requirement to make quantitative disclosures about the fair values of derivative 
instruments, these disclosures varied in detail and clarity.  
Chalmers (2001) examines Australian firms’ derivative instrument disclosures 
over three phases, namely a pure voluntary disclosure phase, a coercive voluntary 
disclosure phase, and a mandatory disclosure phase. The study examines firms’ 
responses to information demands in a changing regulatory environment from 1992 to 
1998. Chalmers used a voluntary reporting disclosure index to capture derivative 
disclosures. The index was constructed using the disclosures suggested in the 
Australian Society of Corporate Treasurers' Industry Statement6 and ED65: 
Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. The results indicated that firms 
were responsive to quasi-contractual disclosure regulation since the number of firms 
registering a positive voluntary reporting disclosure index increased in each phase. 
The release of ED65, combined with the increased probability of the development of a 
standard, was found to be influential in achieving enhanced reporting of derivative 
instruments.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The industry statement was issued in March 1995 and requested firms to include derivatives 
information in their financial statements. 
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3.2  Disclosure Transparency of Derivative Information and Firm Characteristics  
While a number of studies have examined the relation between the use of 
derivative instruments and firm characteristics (Berkman et al., 2002; Nguyen and 
Faff, 2002; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Géczy, Minton 
and Schrand, 1997)7, no prior studies have identified the characteristics associated 
with the disclosure of derivative information. To develop our research questions, we 
therefore draw on prior research that has explored the quality of other disclosures in 
financial statements (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989, 1991 and 1992; Imhoff, 1992; 
Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). These studies provide 
evidence on the association between corporate disclosure practices and firm 
characteristics such as size, leverage, profitability, listing status, external auditor, 
scope of business and industry type.  Researchers use several theories to explain these 
characteristics. These theories include agency costs, political costs, proprietary costs, 
corporate governance and information asymmetry (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). 
Sengupta (1998) investigates the link between disclosure quality and cost of debt 
financing. This study indicates that firms with high disclosure quality ratings enjoy a 
lower effective interest cost of issuing debt. This is because timely and detailed 
disclosures may reduce the perception of default risk which leads to a lower cost of 
debt. The results indicate that disclosure quality is an important factor for lenders and 
underwriters in estimating a firm’s default risk.  
3.2.1. Size 
Firm size is one of the characteristics that have been extensively related to 
disclosure policy. There are many reasons why large firms might disclose more 
                                                 
7  These studies have generally found that firm size, leverage and liquidity are associated with the use 
of derivatives.  
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information (Cooke 1991).  Singhvi and Desai (1971), indicate that this is because 
these firms are expected to provide more transparent information since they incur 
lower cost of accumulating detailed information, they have more marketable 
securities and they have greater ease of financing.  Cooke (1989) suggests that a 
further incentive for greater transparency is to reduce political costs. Cooke (1989, 
1991), Firth (1979), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace and 
Naser (1995), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Riahi-Belkaoui (2001), and Ali, Ahmed 
and Henry (2003) provide evidence that firm size is positively associated with 
disclosure level. With respect to the oil and gas industry, however, Malone et al. 
(1993) report that there is no association between size and disclosure quality.  In spite 
of this finding, we expect large firms to provide more transparent derivative 
information because they use derivatives extensively, there are economies of scale 
associated with disclosure and they may be subject to political and monitoring costs. 
This leads to our first research question: 
RQ1:  Do large firms in the extractive industries provide more transparent derivative 
disclosures in their financial statements than smaller firms?  
3.2.2. High performance firms  
The performance of firms has also been identified as a factor affecting 
disclosure quality. A profitable firm may provide more detailed information to 
communicate good news to investors in order to improve firm value (Ali et al., 2003) 
and to boost management compensation (Wallace et al., 1994). However, while Ali et 
al. (2003) provide evidence of a positive relationship between profitability and 
compliance level, Wallace and Naser (1995) identify a negative relationship between 
these variables.  Therefore, our second research question is: 
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RQ2: Do high performance firms in the extractive industries provide more 
transparent derivative disclosures in their financial statements than lower 
performing firms? 
 3.2.3. Type of firm  
A unique feature of Australian firms in the extractive industries, especially the 
mining industry, is that they are permitted by legislation to form a no-liability 
company.  This is due to the uncertainty or speculative nature of the industry, 
especially in the exploration phase.  In a no-liability company, shareholders are not 
legally liable to pay any calls, either while the company is a going concern or in its 
winding up (Ford, 1986).  Therefore it is expected that disclosure transparency may 
differ between no-liability firms and limited liability firms. Further, no-liability firms 
tend to be smaller firms, and, because they tend not to have reached the production 
phase, they are also less likely to be profitable. As a result, they may be reluctant to 
provide transparent information due to: a) the high cost of accumulating detailed 
information, b) the fact that they may feel that the disclosure could endanger their 
competitive position (Singhvi and Desai, 1971), and c) they are not subject to political 
costs (Cooke, 1989). The above leads to the following research question: 
RQ3: Do no-liability companies in the extractive industries have less transparent 
derivative disclosures in their financial statements than limited liability firms?   
3.2.4. Auditor 
Auditors play an important role in determining the transparency of information 
disclosed by their clients. Large audit firms tend to influence clients to provide high 
quality information so that their reputations are not diminished (Ali et al., 2003). 
However empirical studies provide mixed results. Singhvi and Desai (1971), Ahmed 
and Nicholls (1994), and Wallace and Naser (1995) find that auditor size is positively 
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associated with disclosure level but no significant association is documented in Firth 
(1979), Malone at al. (1993), Wallace et al. (1994), and Ali et al. (2003).  Hence, our 
fourth research question is: 
RQ4:  Is the disclosure transparency of derivative information in the financial 
statements of firms in the extractive industries associated with the choice of 
auditor? 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1.  Sample selection and test period 
Data for our study are sourced from the annual reports of all Australian listed 
companies in the extractive industries. These industries play a significant role in the 
Australian economy, where they generated exports worth more than $30 billion in 
2000 to 2001 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003a; 2003b). They 
represent approximately 25% of the listed companies on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX).  Approximately 27% of firms in the sample are no-liability firms. 
To be included in the sample, a firm first must be listed on the ASX for the years from 
1998 to 2001.  
 
4.2.  Research design 
 4.2.1. Transparency of derivative disclosures 
A number of previous studies rely on corporate disclosure quality as measured 
by users such as the Financial Analysts Federation (Imhoff, 1992; Sengupta, 1998; 
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001; Heflin, Shaw and Wild, 2001; Shaw, 2003), the Association for 
Investment Management Research (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lang et al., 2003; 
Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Price, 1998) and the Center for 
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International Financial Analysis and Research (Hope, 2003a and 2003b). However, 
these studies examine disclosure quality based on all the information disclosed in the 
annual report and other media. Other studies measure disclosure quality based on a 
self-constructed disclosure index. These include Cooke (1989, 1991 and 1992), 
Malone et al. (1993), Wallace (1988), Wallace et al. (1994), Botosan (1997), Tower, 
Hancock and Taplin (1999), Chalmers (2001), Taplin, Tower and Hancock (2002), 
and Ali et al. (2003). In these studies researchers employ either a weighted or a non-
weighted index (Marston and Shrives, 1991). A weighted index requires the conduct 
of a survey so that financial statement users can rate disclosure items listed by the 
researchers. The unweighted index is less subjective than the weighted index. In this 
case, researchers adopt a dichotomous procedure where a score of one is given for 
disclosed items, and zero otherwise. Therefore the index assumes that each item of 
disclosure is equally important (Cooke, 1991). 
In this paper we develop an unweighted index for derivative disclosures to 
represent disclosure transparency based on the information in the financial statements 
and notes to the financial statements. Five categories of information are identified 
from AASB 1033. These are policy information, hedges of anticipated future 
transactions, risk information, net fair value information, and commodity contracts 
regarded as financial instruments. A score of one is given for each item based on the 
detailed information provided, both qualitative and quantitative, and a zero amount is 
allocated if firms failed to provide any information required. Table 1 documents the 
attributes of the disclosure index. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
To develop the index, we examine the notes to the financial statements. First, 
we examine the note containing the statement of accounting policies, where firms 
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disclose the objectives for holding or issuing derivative financial instruments.  In the 
event that firms fail to indicate their hedging behaviour in this note, we examine the 
note on financial instruments. We posit three possibilities with disclosures. The 
entities either: a) disclose that they hedge the risk internally or externally, b) disclose 
that they do not hedge, and c) disclose nothing about hedging. After identifying the 
hedge behaviour of firms, we then capture information about hedge disclosures and 
net fair values of financial assets, financial liabilities and derivative financial 
instruments. This information is disclosed in the note on financial instruments.   
To make each component of the score add equally to the total score, we divide 
the component score by the number of items in that component. Therefore each 
component contributes a score of one to the total score of five. The transparency of 
derivative disclosure is measured by dividing the total score for each firm by the total 
possible score for a firm. For example, if a firm provides all information listed in 
Table 1, the “disclosure transparency” of that firm is one (i.e, 5/5), and the firm is said 
to provide more transparent disclosures of derivative information. However, firms are 
not penalised if the information is not relevant to their situation i.e. the total score and 
total possible score are both reduced. The disclosure transparency is defined below: 
 
TRANSPARENCY  = firm’s actual disclosure score (1) 
     firm’s  total possible disclosure score  
 
4.2.2.  The association between the disclosure transparency of derivative information 
and firm characteristics 
 
We examine the association between the disclosure transparency of derivative 
information and firm characteristics using the model specified in Equation 2. 
TRANSPARENCYit = α0 + α1SIZEit+α2PROFITit+α3PEit+α4TYPEit+α5AUDITit+α6MTBit+ 
α7R&Dit +α8DTEit+ εit    (2) 
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Where: 
TRANSPARENCY = actual disclosure score/firm’s total possible disclosure score 
SIZE      = log of total assets  
PROFIT  = earnings before tax/total assets  
PE  = price/earnings before extraordinary items per share 
TYPE      = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise 
AUDIT        = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise 
MTB  = market value/net book value of tangible assets for the given 
 class of equity 
R&D      = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. 
DTE     = total liabilities divided by book value of common equity 
 
We define SIZE as the log of total assets. This is because the measure “total 
assets” is the least affected by market fluctuations in the oil and gas industry (Malone 
et al., 1993). Because of the variability in the level of total assets between firms, we 
follow prior research and transform the size variable into its natural log in order to 
normalise the distribution.8 High performance is measured by two variables: 
profitability (PROFIT) and price-earnings ratio (PE).  The former measures current 
performance while the latter provides a measure of the market’s perception of the 
firm’s expected future performance. Whether the firm is a no-liability firm or a 
limited liability firm is indicated by TYPE, while AUDIT distinguishes between the 
use of a Big 5 (or Big 6) auditor and a smaller audit firm.  
We also include three control variables that have been found in prior research to 
be associated with disclosure. We use two variables for growth opportunities. First, 
MTB measures the market value of the firm divided by the book value of tangible 
assets. This provides a measure of the market’s perceptions of the value of the firm 
relative to assets-in-place, with a high value suggesting growth opportunities (Smith 
and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Second, we use a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether or not the firm engages in research and development activities 
                                                 
8 The largest firm is BHP Billiton Ltd. with total assets amounting $37,082m, and the smallest firm is 
Kalrez Energy Ltd. with total assets amounting $0.97m. 
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(R&D). R&D activities are an indication that the firm is likely to grow in the future 
(Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Percy, 2000; Clinch, 1991).  
The other control variable is leverage, which is represented by total liabilities to 
book value of common equity.  Theory suggests that firms with high leverage are 
expected to reduce disclosure since the agency costs of debt are controlled through 
restrictive debt covenants rather than increased disclosure in financial reports (Jensen, 
1986; Eng and Mak, 2003). However, prior studies such as Hossain and Adams 
(1995) and Ali et al. (2003) provide evidence that leverage is not significantly 
associated with disclosure. Further, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) indicate that leverage 
is positively related to disclosure levels. Specific to the oil and gas industry, Malone 
et al. (1993) indicate that firms with high debt-to-equity ratios disclose greater 
financial information than firms with low debt-to-equity ratios. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1. Sample 
As at the end of 2001, there were 354 firms involved in the extractive industries 
listed on the ASX.  We were unable to obtain the annual reports for 89 firms and these 
were eliminated from our sample.  The sample was further reduced to 137 firms by 
excluding: a) foreign listed firms, b) newly listed/delisted firms, c) mining servicing 
firms, d) firms in receivership and e) firms with missing data. Table 2 summarises the 
sample selection procedure.   
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 presents details of the use of derivative instruments among the 137 
firms, classified by type of firm. Only 65 firms indicate that they use derivative 
instruments during the period of study, and the majority of these are limited liability 
companies. The number of firms disclosing that they do not use derivatives increases 
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from one (1998) to six (2001) for limited liability firms, but decreases from ten (1998) 
to eight (2001) for no-liability firms. The majority of firms making no disclosures are 
no-liability firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5.2. Disclosure transparency 
5.2.1. Firms’ disclosure scores  
Table 4 reports the number of firms classified according to the transparency of 
their derivative disclosures. Panel A reports the level of disclosure for the user sample 
(65 companies) for each year. The number of firms in the user sample providing more 
transparent information is indicated in column 7. In 1998 there are 11 firms disclosing 
100% of derivative information. The number increases to 15 in 1999, but decreases to 
ten in 2000 and 2001. This decrease is offset by the increase in the number of firms 
providing 90% to 99% information. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
5.2.2. Disclosure components 
As discussed in the previous section, each component of the disclosure index 
plays an important role in determining the transparency of derivative disclosures. 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for each disclosure component for the pooled 
sample (65 times 4 years). Panel A reports the statistics for all firms. The mean for 
each disclosure component (Panel A) indicates that firms disclose almost all 
information with regard to policy information (99.62%). However they withhold some 
information in relation to hedges of anticipated transactions (76.72%), risk 
information (81.09%), net fair value information (81.30%), and commodity contracts 
information (36.54%). 
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A comparison of Panel B and Panel C indicates that no-liability firms make 
fewer disclosures than limited liability firms. This may be because no-liability firms 
incur higher relative costs of accumulating detailed information about hedges of 
anticipated transactions, risk information, net fair value and commodity contracts 
information. Alternatively, increased disclosure could endanger their competitive 
position. 
Further investigation of each component reveals that some firms fail to disclose 
detailed information about the expected timing of recognition of any deferred or 
unrecognized gain or loss as revenue or expense, the aggregate net fair value, and the 
carrying amount and net fair value of either the individual asset or appropriate 
grouping of individual assets. Even though it is argued that fair value is relevant for 
users to assess the effect of derivative transactions (Rasch and Wilson, 1998), some 
firms appear to be unwilling to move to fair value accounting (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2000). We also find that firms do not disclose their reasons for not 
reducing the carrying amount to net fair value. As a consequence they do not provide 
any information about evidence for their belief that the carrying amount will be 
recovered.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Table 6 reports the trend of derivative disclosures among user firms over the 
period of the study. Panel A indicates that policy information as required by 
paragraph 5.2 (a), (b) and paragraph 5.3 AASB 1033 is fully disclosed in all years 
except 1998. Further, there is a steady increase over the four year period in disclosure 
transparency of hedges of anticipated transactions and risk information.   
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
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Of concern, Panel B shows that the mean score for net fair value information is 
decreasing for limited liability firms. However, there is no consistent pattern in the 
trend for no-liability firms. We find that firms continue to use their discretion in the 
disclosure of certain information, in particular, net fair value information, even though 
this is required by AASB 1033. Therefore, as in Chalmers and Godfrey (2000), this 
lack of disclosure may hinder the understandability, comparability, and consistency, 
and hence the transparency of derivative disclosures among firms in the extractive 
industries. 
 
5.2.3. Disclosure transparency of derivative information and firm characteristics 
Standard regression 
Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the 
dependent and independent variables in the firm characteristics model. Panel A shows 
that, for the dependent variable, the average transparency score is 88.71% for the 
pooled sample. Examining each year reveals that average transparency increases from 
86.29% in 1998 to 90.23% in 2001. This indicates that the level of derivative 
disclosures among firms in the extractive industries has increased for each year. The 
level of dispersion across the period of study appears to be reducing, as indicated by 
the standard deviation which has reduced from 0.1137 in 1998 to 0.0772 in 2001.   
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Panel A shows that there is little variability in the means for size, profitability, 
leverage (debt-to-equity ratio) and research and development over the period of study. 
The means of the price-earnings ratio and market-to-book ratio are more variable, 
with positive means in two years and negative in two years. The proportion of limited 
liability firms increases over the period from 58% to 66% while in all years more than 
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80% of firms use a Big Six auditor. Panel B indicates that, while the size variable is 
correlated with a number of other variables, only two coefficients exceed 0.60. This 
suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. 
Table 8 presents the results of the regression analysis of the association between 
disclosure transparency and firm characteristics.9 As predicted, firm size is positively 
related to disclosure transparency and is highly significant (p < 0.001). This indicates 
that large firms tend to provide more transparent information compared to small 
firms. Our finding is consistent with work undertaken by Singhvi and Desai (1971), 
Firth (1979), Cooke (1989, 1991), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) and Ali et al. (2003). This finding is probably due to lower 
information processing costs for large firms but it is also possible that higher political 
costs incurred by these firms encourage greater transparency.  The coefficient 
estimates for profitability and price-earnings ratio are also positively significant (p = 
0.0391 and p = 0.0406 respectively) but firm type and auditor are not significant. Two 
of the control variables, debt-to-equity ratio and market-to-book ratio, are significant 
(p = 0.0212 and p = 0.0021 respectively). However, contrary to our expectation, 
market-to-book ratio is negatively related to the transparency of derivative 
information. The coefficient estimate for research and development is not 
significant.10
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Time might influence the behaviour of all variables, and therefore might affect 
the above results. The preceding analysis assumes that each firm-year can be treated 
as an independent observation. However the degrees of freedom in calculating the 
significance levels are overstated if the independent variables fail to remove 
                                                 
9 Since heteroscedasticity is present, we use White’s Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Standard Errors 
(White, 1980) to estimate the model.  
10 Our results are consistent when we estimate the model without the outliers. 
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autocorrelation in the dependent variable (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Therefore we 
repeat the regression analysis for each year and also using average data for the four 
years.11 Results are reported in Table 9, which indicates that size is only significant in 
2000 and 2001 at p = 0.05 and p < 0.001, respectively. Size is also significant at p = 
0.05 when we use average data. We also find that profitability is significant at p = 
0.05 in 2000 and at p = 0.10 for average data. The significance of profitability may be 
due to the reaction towards the re-issuance of AASB 1033 in 1999. Since firms with 
high profitability may be subject to political costs and monitoring costs, they may 
provide more transparent information, especially immediately after the issuance of 
accounting pronouncements. However none of the variables are significant in 1998 
and 1999 suggesting that the results in Table 10 might be influenced by particular 
years (Lang and Lundholm, 1993).12
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Ranked regression 
We repeat the regression analysis using the ranked regression procedure as in 
Lang and Lundholm (1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Ali et al. 
(2003). The procedure is an alternative approach to other robust techniques, and a 
powerful method for analysing data with monotonic and non-linear relations (Iman 
and Conover, 1979; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; and Wallace et al., 1994). The rank 
transformation is a simple procedure where the continuous variables are replaced with 
their rank. Table 10 shows that the explanatory power of this model increases from 
22.37% (Table 8) to 32.98%. Size, price-earnings ratio and debt-to-equity ratio are 
                                                 
11 Similar approaches were performed in Lang and Lundholm (1993). 
12 Except for 1998, there is no heteroscedasticity present in year-by-year and average regression 
analysis. 
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positively related to disclosure transparency and are highly significant at p < 0.001.13 
However, market-to-book ratio and profitability are not significant.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
Table 11 shows the results of ranked regression for year-by-year and four-year 
average data. The table indicates that leverage (RDTE) is positively significant at p < 
0.05 (1999, 2000, and 2001) and at p < 0.10 (1998 and average data). The price-
earnings ratio is positively related to disclosure transparency at p < 0.05 for 1998 and 
at p = 0.01 for 2000 and for the average data. However R&D is negatively related to 
disclosure transparency at p = 0.0631 in 2001. Size is only significant in 2001 and for 
the average data.14
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we examine the transparency of derivative disclosures of 
Australian firms in the extractive industries using 1998 to 2001 annual reports. The 
quality of financial reporting has become a major corporate governance issue in recent 
years and disclosure transparency is an important component of the quality of 
financial reporting.  We measure disclosure transparency using an index developed 
from AASB 1033 Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments. We then 
examine the relationship between disclosure transparency and firm characteristics, 
represented by size, performance, growth opportunities, auditor, type of extractive 
firm and leverage.  
                                                 
13 The results are based on the White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors, and are 
consistent with the results of estimation without the outliers. 
14 We re-estimate the model without the outliers, and the results are consistent with the full sample for 
1999 and 2001.  
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We find that the transparency of derivative disclosures among user firms has 
increased over the period of the study. However, companies in the extractive 
industries still use discretion in the disclosure of derivative information, especially in 
relation to net fair value. Our regression results relating to firm characteristics indicate 
that size, price-earnings ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio, and to a limited extent, market-
to-book ratio, research and development and profitability, are associated with 
disclosure transparency.   
Our results point to a lack of enforcement of accounting standards in Australia, 
consistent with the findings of Hope (2003a).  This is of concern in view of 
Australia’s move to adopt international accounting standards as global harmonization 
will only be achieved if countries rigorously enforce standards.  
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the findings could be biased since 
our sample is based on those companies that responded to our request for annual 
reports or that were included in the Connect4 Annual Report Collection Database.  
Second, our sample of firms using derivatives is relatively small and this may have 
limited the power of our statistical tests. Lack of variability in our independent 
variables such as type of auditor may also have led to insignificant findings. These 
limitations provide opportunities for future research to further explore the association 
between firm characteristics and the transparency of derivative disclosures. In 
addition, exploring these issues in other industries and in other jurisdictions are 
fruitful avenues for further research.  
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Table 1 
 Components of derivative disclosure index 
 
 Reference Score 
Policy Information   
 Accounting policies and method adopted Para 5.2 (a) 1 
 a) Extent and nature of the underlying financial instruments, b) 
including significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, 
timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows. 
Para 5.2 (b) 2* 
 Objectives for holding or issuing derivative financial instruments  Para 5.3 1 
Component score  4 
Hedge of Anticipated Transaction   
 a) A description of the anticipated transaction, b) including the period 
of time until they are expected to occur. 
Para 5.8 (a) 2* 
 A description of the hedging instruments. Para 5.8 (b) 1 
 a) Amount of any deferred or unrecognized gain or loss and b) the 
expected timing of recognition as revenue or expense. 
Para 5.8 (c) 2* 
Component score  5 
Risk Information   
 Contractual repricing or maturity dates for interest rate risk Para 5.4 (a) 1 
 Effective interest rates or weighted average  Para 5.4 (b) 1 
 The maximum amount of credit risk exposure at reporting date Para 5.5 (a) 1 
Component score  3 
Net Fair Value Information   
 a) The aggregate net fair value as at the reporting date, b) showing 
separately the aggregate net fair value of those financial assets or 
financial liabilities which are not readily traded on organized markets 
in standardized form. 
Para 5.6 (a) 2* 
 The method or methods adopted in determining net fair value. Para 5.6 (b) 1 
 Any significant assumptions made in determining net fair value. Para 5.6 (c) 1 
 The carrying amount and the net fair value of either the individual 
asset or appropriate groupings of those individual assets. 
Para 5.7 (a) 1 
 a) The reasons for not reducing the carrying amount, b) including the 
nature of the evidence that provides the basis for management’s belief 
that the carrying amount will be recovered.   
Para 5.7 (b) 2* 
Component score  7 
Commodity Contracts Information   
 Contract for commodity gold Para 5.9 (a) 1 
Component score  1 
* A score of one is allocated for each item discloses in the notes to the financial statements. 
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Table 2 
Summary of sample selection procedure 
 
Selection Criteria 
No of Firm  
No of listed firms in the extractive industries 354 
- Firms that did not respond and are not on Connect 4 89 
- Foreign firms 19 
- Newly listed/delisted firms 43 
- Mining servicing/investment firms 6 
- Domain / under receivership 2 
- Missing information 46 
- Missing share price data 12 
Usable annual reports 137 
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Table 3 
The use of derivative financial instruments for hedging purposes 
  
Limited Liability Firm No Liability Firm Total Status 
1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 
User 38  40  43 43 27 25 22 22 65 65 65 65 
Unknown 7 7 23 34 54 52 37 24 61 59 60 58 
Non-user 1 1 5 6 10 12 7 8 11 13 12 14 
Total 46 48 71 83 91 89 67 54 137 137 137 137 
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Table 4 
 Disclosure transparency of firms in the Australian extractive industries 
Year < 30% 30%-49% 50%-69% 70%-89% 90%-99% 100% 
 
Panel A: User sample (n=65) 
 
1998 0 0 7 27 20 11 
1999 0 0 4 25 21 15 
2000 0 0 3 25 27 10 
2001 0 0 1 23 31 10 
 
Panel B: Limited Liability firms in user sample  
 
1998 (n=38) 0 0 1 13 14 10 
1999 (n=40) 0 0 1 15 13 11 
2000 (n=43) 0 0 2 14 19 8 
2001 (n=43) 0 0 0 13 22 8 
 
Panel C: No-liability firms in user sample 
 
1998 (n=27) 0 0 6 14 6 1 
1999 (n=25) 0 0 3 10 8 4 
2000 (n=22) 0 0 1 11 8 2 
2001 (n=22) 0 0 1 10 9 2 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of disclosure components (pooled sample) 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Minimum Maximum
 
Panel A: User Sample (n=260) 
     
Policy Information 0.9962 0.0620 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Hedge of Anticipated Transaction 0.7672 0.3490 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Risk Information 0.8109 0.2840 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Net Fair Value Information 0.8130 0.1404 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 
Commodity Contracts Information 0.3654 0.4825 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel B: Limited liability firms in User Sample (n=168) 
   
Policy Information 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hedge of Anticipated Transaction 0.8508 0.2539 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Risk Information 0.8571 0.2542 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Net Fair Value Information 0.8187 0.1388 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 
Commodity Contracts Information 0.4405 0.4979 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel C: No-liability firms in User Sample (n=92) 
   
Policy Information 0.9891 0.1043 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Hedge of Anticipated Transaction 0.6145 0.4380 0.8000 0.0000 1.0000 
Risk Information 0.7264 0.3160 0.6667 0.0000 1.0000 
Net Fair Value Information 0.8028 0.1435 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 
Commodity Contracts Information 0.2283 0.4220 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 6 
Mean disclosure components of user firms for the period 1998 to 2001 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
Panel A: User Sample (n=65) 
    
Policy Information 0.9846  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hedges of Anticipated Transactions 0.6851 0.7272 0.7979 0.8585 
Risk Information 0.7513 0.8077 0.8385 0.8462 
Net Fair Value Information 0.8198 0.8152 0.8051 0.8121 
Commodity Contracts Information 0.3692 0.3692 0.3538 0.3692 
 
Panel B: Limited liability firms   
 
(n=38) 
 
(n=40) 
 
(n=43) 
 
(n=43) 
Policy Information 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hedges of Anticipated Transactions 0.8531 0.8783 0.8512 0.8992 
Risk Information 0.8421 0.8667 0.8605 0.8760 
Net Fair Value Information 0.8515 0.8255 0.8109 0.8090 
Commodity Contracts Information 0.5000 0.4750 0.4186 0.4186 
 
Panel C: No-liability firms   
 
(n=27) 
 
(n=25) 
 
(n=22) 
 
(n=22) 
Policy Information 0.9630 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hedges of Anticipated Transactions 0.4444 0.4853 0.6939 0.7788 
Risk Information 0.6235 0.7133 0.7955 0.7879 
Net Fair Value Information 0.7751 0.7986 0.7938 0.8182 
Commodity Contracts Information 0.1852 0.2000 0.2273 0.2727 
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix: firm characteristics model 
 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard deviations) 
Variable 1998 (n=65) 1999 (n=65) 2000 (n=65) 2001 (n=65) Pooled (n=260) 
TRANSPARENCY 0.8629(0.1137) 0.8905(0.09854) 0.8928(0.08691) 0.9023(0.0772) 0.8871(0.0956) 
SIZE 18.3682(2.0473) 18.4466(1.9903) 18.5134(1.9649) 18.5639(1.9698) 18.4726 (1.9830) 
PROFIT -0.0616(0.2921) -0.0392(0.2002) -0.0965(0.6666) -0.0325(0.2857) -0.0574 (0.4020) 
PE -6.8185(104.9639) 48.0050(259.2588) 6.2190(65.5440) -0.0247(36.8096) 11.8452 
(145.5570) 
TYPE 0.4154(0.4966) 0.3846(0.4903) 0.3385(0.4769) 0.3385(0.4769) 0.3692 (0.4835) 
AUDIT 0.8154(0.3910) 0.8308(0.3779) 0.8615(0.3481) 0.8615(0.3481) 0.8423 (0.3652) 
MTB 0.0537(16.2549) -0.1815(19.8379) 4.0848(7.9907) -10.0741(96.6262) -1.5293 (50.1274) 
R&D 0.3231(0.4966) 0.3231(0.4713) 0.3231(0.4713) 0.2923(0.4584) 0.3154 (0.4656) 
DTE 0.3064(0.5106) 0.3156(0.5481) 0.2819(0.4263) 0.2931(96.6262) 0.2992 (0.4854) 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix* 
 TRANSP SIZE PROFIT PE  TYPE AUDIT MTB R&D DTE 
TRANSPARENCY 1.0000         
SIZE 0.4696*** 1.0000        
PROFIT 0.2178*** 0.2820*** 1.0000       
PE 0.1309** 0.1398** 0.0280 1.0000      
TYPE -0.2718*** -0.6193*** -
0.2022*** 
-0.0712 1.0000     
AUDIT 0.1421** 0.3810*** 0.2094*** 0.1073* -
0.3906*** 
1.0000    
MTB -0.0415 -0.0062 -0.0116 -0.0027 0.0609 -0.0487 1.0000   
R&D 0.2999*** 0.6307*** 0.1158* 0.1037* -
0.3306*** 
0.2937*** 0.0688 1.0000  
DTE 0.3315*** 0.5275*** 0.0619 0.1570** -
0.2505*** 
0.1043 0.0017 0.2854*** 1.0000
* Pearson correlations are adjusted automatically by SPSS when variables are dichotomous 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSPARENCY = firm’s actual disclosure scores/firm’s total possible disclosure 
scores 
SIZE  = log of total assets 
PROFIT  = earnings before tax/total assets 
PE  = price/earnings before extraordinary items per share 
TYPE  = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT  = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise 
MTB  = market value/net book value of tangible assets for the given class of equity 
R&D  = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. 
DTE  = total liabilities divided by book value of common equity                        
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Table 8 
Results of regression analysis of the association between disclosure transparency and 
firm characteristics (n=260) 
 
TRANSPARENCYit=α0+α1SIZEit+α2PROFITit+α3PEit+α4TYPEit+α5AUDITit+α6MT
BBit 
+α7R&Dit +α8DTEit+ εit
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistics Prob 
Constant ? 0.5602 0.0773 7.2431 0.0000 
SIZE + 0.0178 0.0043 4.1864 0.0000*** 
PROFIT + 0.0267 0.0129 2.0742 0.0391** 
PE + 3.93E-05 1.91E-05 2.0587 0.0406** 
TYPE - 0.0016 0.0146 0.1080 0.9141 
Audit +/- -0.0131 0.0188 -0.6956 0.4873 
MTB + -8.25E-05 2.65E-05 -3.1070 0.0021*** 
R&D + 0.0071 0.0136 0.5194 0.6039 
DTE +/- 0.0232 0.0100 2.3196 0.0212** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.2237  Durbin-Watson Statistics = 1.9801 
F statistics = 10.3266  p-value = 0.0000 
 
 
*** and ** indicate significance at p < 0.001 and p < 0.05 respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSPARENCY = firm’s actual disclosure scores/firm’s total possible disclosure scores 
SIZE = log of total assets  
PROFIT = earnings before tax/total assets  
PE = price/earnings before extraordinary items per share 
TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise 
MTB = market value/net book value of tangible assets for the given class  
       of equity 
R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. 
DTE      = total liabilities divided by book value of common equity 
i      = firm 
t      = year 
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Table 9 
The association between firm characteristics and disclosure transparency on a year-
by-year basis and an average of four years’ data (n=65) 
 
TRANSPARENCYit=α0+α1SIZEit+α2PROFITit+α3PEit+α4TYPEit+α5AUDITit+α6MT
BBit 
+α7R&Dit +α8DTEit+ εit
 
Variable Sign 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
Constant ? 0.5296(2.3080) 0.6187(2.9074) 0.5751(3.6711) 0.5054(3.2678) 0.5758(3.9533) 
SIZE + 0.0163(1.2444) 0.0147(1.2726) 0.0184(2.1056)** 0.0233(2.7021)*** 0.0171(2.1197)** 
PROFIT + 0.0295(0.4844) -0.0101(-0.1623) 0.0356(2.2524)** 0.0002(0.0055) 0.0831(1.9538)* 
PE + 6.29E-05(1.0282) 1.10E-05 (0.2331) 0.0002(0.8821) 9.54E-06(0.0366) 2.13E-05(0.1720) 
TYPE - -0.0141(-0.3410) 0.0090(0.2649) 0.0231(0.9020) 0.0018(0.0768) 0.0135(0.5870) 
Audit +/- 0.0275(0.67351) -0.0308(-0.9013) -0.0363(-1.1111) -0.0346(-1.2031) -0.0156(-0.5170) 
MTB + -0.0004(-1.0282) -5.26E-05(-0.0881) -0.0013(-0.9775) -4.17E-05(-0.4437) 5.68E-05(0.1619) 
R&D + 0.0258(0.7399) 0.0309(0.8974) 0.0051(0.1738) -0.0318(-1.2162) -0.0010(-0.0378) 
DTE +/- 0.0354(1.3490) 0.0380(1.5108) 0.0202(0.6243) 0.0089(0.3629) 0.0275(1.0640) 
      
R2  0.3637 0.2392 0.2936 0.2482 0.3372 
Adjusted R2  0.2728 0.1306 0.1927 0.1408 0.2425 
F statistics  4.001 2.2014 2.9096 2.3109 3.5608 
p-value 0.0008 0.0409 0.0087 0.0323 0.0021 
Durbin-Watson 
Stat. 
1.9916 2.1151 1.960 1.6886 1.9048 
 
Note: Number in italic represents the t-value. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10 respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSPARENCY = firm’s actual disclosure scores/firm’s total possible disclosure scores 
SIZE = log of total assets  
PROFIT = earnings before tax/total assets  
PE = price/earnings before extraordinary items per share 
TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise 
MTB = market value/net book value of tangible assets for the given class  
       of equity 
R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. 
DTE      = total liabilities divided by book value of common equity 
i      = firm 
t      = year 
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Table 10 
Results of regression analysis of the association between disclosure transparency and 
firm characteristics: ranked transformation (n=260) 
 
RTRANSPARENCYit=α0+α1RSIZEit+α2RPROFITit+α3RPEit+α4TYPEit+α5AUDITit 
+α6RMTBit+α7R&Dit +α8RDTEit+ εit
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistics Prob 
Constant ? 28.3921 19.7543 1.4373 0.1519 
RSIZE + 0.3394 0.1007 3.3720 0.0009*** 
RPROFIT + 0.0457 0.0672 0.6805 0.4968 
RPE + 0.2168 0.0625 3.4682 0.0006*** 
TYPE - 16.2860 11.5022 1.4159 0.1580 
Audit +/- 12.4352 12.5933 -0.9874 0.3244 
RMTB + -0.0584 0.0480 -1.2170 0.2248 
R&D + -9.1751 10.5397 -0.8705 0.3848 
RDTE +/- 0.2953 0.0727 4.0610 0.0001*** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.3298  Durbin-Watson Statistics = 2.0311 
F statistics = 16.9348  p-value = 0.0000 
 
*** indicates significance at p < 0.001. 
  
Variable Definitions: 
RTRANSPARENCY = rank of disclosure transparency 
RSIZE = rank of total assets (in thousands)  
RPROFIT = rank of profitability  
RPE = rank of price/earnings ratio 
TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise 
RMTB = rank of market-to-book ratio 
R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. 
RDTE = rank of total liabilities divided by book value of common equity 
i     = firm 
t     = year 
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Table 11 
Results of regression analysis of the association between disclosure transparency and 
firm characteristics: ranked transformation on a year-by-year basis and an average of 
four years’ data (n=65) 
 
RTRANSPARENCYit=α0+α1RSIZEit+α2RPROFITit+α3RPEit+α4TYPEit+α5AUDITit 
+α6RMTBit+α7R&Dit +α8RDTEit+ εit
 
 
Variable Sign 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
Constant ? -1.6311(-0.1513) 11.3338(1.0231) -0.3126(-0.0327) 12.2362(1.3574) -0.3448(-0.0401) 
RSIZE + 0.3489(1.5457) 0.3441(1.3742) 0.3082(1.4997) 0.5289(2.5131)** 0.4950(2.4063)** 
RPROFIT + 0.0651(0.5202) 0.0449(0.3207) 0.1007(0.7465) -0.1327(-0.8845) -0.1118(-0.8609) 
RPE + 0.2538(2.2119)** 0.1295(0.9058) 0.4025(3.1028)*** 0.1262(09221) 0.3289(2.9072)*** 
TYPE - 4.5127(0.6987) 7.3515(1.1111) 8.4531(1.5461) -1.9163(-0.3543) 4.3767(0.8670) 
Audit +/- 4.3953(0.8124) -8.4463(-1.3260) 0.2320(0.0358) -6.6545(-0.9327) -1.1674(-0.1891) 
RMTB + -0.0546(-0.5281) -0.0501(-0.4307) -0.1632(-1.5469) 0.1154(1.0071) 0.0914(0.8493) 
R&D + -1.7565(-0.3421) 1.2673(0.2052) -5.0549(-0.8653) -11.4372(-1.8960)* -6.4618(-1.1869) 
RDTE +/- 0.2880(1.9988)* 0.3026(2.0738)** 0.3180(2.2104)** 0.2861(2.1446)** 0.2498(1.9579)* 
      
Adjusted R2  0.3988 0.2047 0.3248 0.2804 0.3831 
F statistics  
  
6.3065 3.0590 4.8482 4.1170 5.9673 
p-value 0.0000 0.0063 0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson 
Stat. 
2.0934 2.0785 1.8453 1.8655 2.0722 
Note: Number in italic represents the t-value. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10 respectively.   
 
Variable Definitions: 
RTRANSPARENCY = rank of disclosure transparency      
RSIZE = rank of total assets (in thousands)  
RPROFIT = rank of profitability  
RPE = rank of price/earnings ratio 
TYPE = 1 for no-liability company, 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT = 1 for Big-5/6 auditor, 0 otherwise 
RMTB = rank of market-to-book ratio 
R&D = 1 for R&D firm, 0 otherwise. 
RDTE = rank of total liabilities divided by book value of common equity 
i     = firm 
t     = year 
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